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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
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This paper investigates the issue of disappearing dividends in Hong Kong and other East Asia 
countries: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. We find that the number of dividend paying firms in Hong 
Kong declines 35 % during the period from 1980 to 1999. In contrast, the aggregated dividend payout 
amount increases dramatically, 233.91% in real term during the same time frame. We argue that the 
reasons behind are dividend concentration and earning concentration, i.e., the small amount of high 
profitability firms provide a huge supply of dividend. We also confirm that firms that are more likely 
to pay dividends tend to be larger and more profitable, but firms with fewer investments are not 
necessarily less likely to pay dividend. Moreover, the combination of the effects of changing firm 
characteristics and the declining propensity to pay, plus the negative dividend premium which signals 
no incentive to pay help explain why the proportion of dividend payers in Hong Kong are 
continuously dropping during our sample period. Despite the similar dividend-paying trend in U.S. 
and Hong Kong, the level of proportion to pay differs significantly in two economies. Our regression 
results confirm that firms owing more debt are less likely to pay dividend. Therefore, the reasons for 
the discrepancy in proportion to pay in U.S. and Hong Kong are 1) U.S. firms issue more debts than 
Hong Kong firms do. 2) U.S. firms have more restrictive covenants on bonds to prevent the higher 
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Introduction 
Despite the growth in market capitalization, recent studies find a surprising trend in the U.S. that 
dividends are disappearing (Fama and French, 2001 and 2002). Many of the financial economists 
observed the trend and have worked on explaining it, but few attentions were paid to putting the 
dividend payout pattern to a multinational context, where different policies affected. We discovered 
in this paper that although the number of dividend payers drops over time in East Asian countries, 
the proportion of firms that pay dividend is higher than that in U.S. Especially, in Hong Kong, the 
percentage of dividend payers is around 20% larger in almost every year. The interesting 
phenomenon raises the question: what contribute to the discrepancy of the difference in the 
percentage of firms that pay dividends between U.S. and East Asia? The paper examines both the 
supply side and demand side effect. We find that the debt-asset ratio is significantly negative with 
the dividend payout in Hong Kong, which can explain the different dividend policies between U.S. 
and Hong Kong. 
This paper starts by confirming the radical disappearing trend in dividend over the past two 
decades in Hong Kong. Specifically, the percentage of dividend payer declines from 79.88% of 
1980 to 44.37% of 1999. (in the same time period, the percentage of dividend payers of the U.S. 
drops from 66% to 20%). In Chapter I，we also discovered reasons for the drop of dividend payers 
in Hong Kong. We agreed on Fama and French's arguing that firm characteristics (size and 
profitability, actually) would affect the dividend paying decision, and pointed out that firms in 
Hong Kong are changing into the characteristics that are typically not willing to pay dividends. 
(The approach used is relative frequencies of payers in portfolios formed on profitability, 
investment opportunities, and size.) Combining the fact that the dividend premium (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004) on equities (measured by the log difference of the dividend payers' market-to-book 
ratio and that of the non-payers) remained as negative in the same time, it would be not hard to see 
why the percentage of dividend payers drops continuously. 
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Before going on to make the cross-country comparison on the debt-asset ratio, we use another 
section in Chapter I to clarify that although the proportion of dividend payers decreases, the 
aggregated number of dividend has not decreased over years. Dividend concentration provides a 
possible answer: the increase in real dividends paid by firms at the top of the dividend distribution 
compensates the dividend reduction associated with the loss of many small payers at the bottom. In 
1999，the top 10% payers paid nearly four times more than the amount they paid in 1980 in real 
term, whereas the bottom 10% payers paid nearly half of the amount in 1990. 
In Chapter II the paper documents the decreasing patterns of dividend payers across the four East 
Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. By incorporating the firm 
characteristics (size, profitability, investment opportunity) and leverage level in the OLS regression, 
we conclude that, firms that owe fewer debts will pay more dividends. Therefore, the reasons for 
the discrepancy in proportion to pay in U.S. and Hong Kong are 1) U.S. firms issue more debt than 
Hong Kong firms do. 2) U.S. firms have more restrictive covenants on bonds to prevent the higher 
default rates. 
The section of literature review on dividend policy is presented below. 
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Literature 
Why firms pay dividends has been a puzzle (Black 1976) for financial economists for many years. 
In their pioneering work, Miller and Modigliani (1961) established that, based on certain 
assumptions, when the investment policy of a firm is held constant, its dividend payout policy has 
no consequences for the shareholders' wealth. Higher dividend payouts lead to lower retained 
earnings and capital gains, as a result, both the level of the firm's dividends and its subsequent 
changes are irrelevant as far as the value of the firm is concerned. 
Contrary to this prediction, however, firms follow extremely deliberate dividend payout strategies. 
Lintner (1956) argues that firms are primarily concerned with the stability of dividends, and 
earnings are the most important determinant of any change in dividends. 
By relaxing the assumptions of M&M，s frictionless world, some leading theories are developed to 
explain actual dividend policies. Bemnan (1970) showed that firms tend to minimize its dividend 
payments because many shareholders are taxed more heavily on their dividend receipts than on 
capital gains. However, extensive empirical investigation on this hypothesis does not seem to be 
borne out by the data. For example, Poterba (1987) documented the remarkable stability of 
dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes in the U.S. 
Another idea, which is particularly popular, is that firms can signal future profitability by paying 
dividends (Bhattacharya 1979). The dividend announcement provides shareholders and the 
marketplace the missing piece of information about current earnings upon which their estimation 
of the firm's future (expected) earnings is based. The latter, of course, determines the current 
market value of the firm. Empirically, Watts (1976) and Aharony and Swary (1980) documented 
that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads to price 
decline. Recent results are more mixed, since current dividend changes do not help predict firm's 
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future earnings growth (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996)). 
Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. 
Gordon (1962) stressed that dividend policy was not independent of investment policy and argued 
that investors view capital gains as riskier than dividends. Easterbrook (1984) says that firms pay 
out dividends in order to reduce agency costs. Dividend payout keeps firms in the capital market, 
where monitoring of managers is available at lower cost. If a firm has free cash flows (Jensen 
(1986))，it is better off sharing them with stockholders as dividend payout (or retiring the firm's 
debt) in order to reduce the possibility of these funds being wasted on unprofitable (negative net 
present value) projects. 
Without reaching a conclusion on why firms pay dividends, Fama and French (Fama and French, 
2001)，observing the declining incidence of dividend-paying firms in U.S. (The proportion of 
payers drops from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999), provide some interesting explanations about 
why firms do not pay dividends. They find that three characteristics affect the decision to pay 
dividends: profitability, investment opportunities, and size. Firms that are more likely to pay 
dividends tend to be larger and more profitable with fewer investments. They also show that 
regardless of firms' characteristics, firms have become less likely to pay dividends. Fama and 
French (2001) confirm predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking order models, more 
profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher dividend payouts. 
The declining incidence of dividend - paying firms contrasts sharply with the increasing level of 
repurchase activity (Grullon and Ikenberry 2000). DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) argue in a 
different way that aggregate real dividend paid by industrial firms increased over the past two 
decades even though the number of dividend payers decrease by over 50%; Baker and Wurgler 
(2004) document a close link between fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends and catering 
incentives; 
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Chapter I Disappearing Dividends 
1. Dividend Facts - from U.S. to Hong Kong 
1.1 Data Collection and Sample Construction 
Following Fama and French, we sample Hong Kong industrial firms with the Pacific-Basin 
Capital Markets Database (PACAP). The PACAP database tracks capital markets data for eight 
Pacific-Basin countries on a continuous and systematic basis, containing extensive information on 
all listed companies from each country's major stock exchange from 1980 through to 1999. For 
this part of the thesis, we will mainly use Hong Kong industrial firms' accounting data within the 
period from 1980 to 1999. We select firms that are non-financial and non-utility and label them 
industrial firms, while understanding that this group also contains other types of firms that might 
not conventionally be called industrials. The sample size is 169 firms in 1980 and expands to 613 
in year 1999. 
The account data to construct our sample and support our analysis in this part is primarily Balance 
Sheet and Income Statement items, that is, Total Assets (A„ BAL9), Long Term Loans (BALI4)， 
Net Income (E„ INC9), Cash Dividends (D,’ MKTl), Ending Price-Common Stock (P„ MKT3) 
and Number of shares outstanding (MKTS). We put the firms with positive D, in year t into the 
"payers" category while naming those with non-positive D, "non-payers". For the group of 
non-payers, we subdivide firms into two groups 一 "former payers" and "never paid". Literally, a 
firm that did not pay dividend for the year in question is classified as a Never-paid firm if it has 
never initiated any dividends, or it is a former-payer if it had paid dividend for at least one time in 
any year before. 
1.2 Disappearing Dividends Facts 
Fama and French (J. Finan. Econ.(2001)) reported that using CRSP and Compustat, data showed a 
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relentless drop in the proportion of dividend payer among U.S. industrial firms from 66.5% in 
1978 to 20.8% in 1999. 
Table 1.2.1 U.S. disappearing dividends 
Fama and French (J. Finan. Econ.(2001)) Table 1 
Counts and percents of CRSP firms in different dividend groups 
Y CRSP New Dividend Non-payers Never paid Former N g ^ lists 
Year firms lists Payer (%) (%) (%) P � $ that pay (%) 
1978 -82 3753 286 58.2 41.8 31.8 10.0 7.5 
1983 - 87 4357 515 36.1 63.9 51.7 12.1 11.7 
1988 -92 4276 352 29.4 70.6 58.7 11.9 8.2 
1993 -98 5208 584 23.5 76.5 66.6 9.8 11.2 
1999 5113 322 20.8 79.2 70.1 9.1 6.3 
In Fama and French's work, they documented that the absolute number of dividend payer 
decreased from 2250 in 1978 to 926 in 2000, percentage change of which is -58.8%. We apply the 
same methodology to Hong Kong data from PACAP industrial firm database. The payer's 
percentage in each year is obtained by dividing the number of dividend payers by the total number 
of firms. We also calculate the non-payer percentage and the percentage for Never-paid firms and 
Former-payers. In Table 1.2.2, we find that the percentage of dividend payer fell from 79.88% of 
1980 to 44.37% of 1999. Dividend payers in new listed company also decline from 50% of 1980 
to 20.59% of 1999. 
Table 1.2.2 Hong Kong disappearing dividends 
Number o f PACAP Hong Kong industrial firms over 1980-1999: Percentage o f dividend payers versus non-payers 
In each year we calculate the number o f dividend payers and divide it by total number o f firms to obtain the payer's 
percentage. We do the same for non-payers. For non-payers we subcategorize them into Never-Paid and 
Former-Payers. 
PACAP 、， rx. .J J 、r Non-Payers Non-Payers New lists 
Year industrial ？ew D m d 二 d Non-payers (^everpa id ) (Former that pay 
firms lists Payer (%) (%) (%『 payers) (%) (%) 
1980 169 79.88 20.12 N .A . N .A . N.A. 
1981 181 14 81.77 18.23 16.57 1.66 50.00 
1982 180 3 78.89 21.11 11.11 10.00 66.67 
1983 175 7 71.43 28.57 11.43 17.14 28.57 
1984 180 9 67.78 32.22 10.00 22.22 55.56 
1985 182 8 73.63 26.37 9.34 17.03 62.50 
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1986 206 16 68.93 31.07 11.65 19.42 43.75 
1987 234 28 77.78 22.22 11.11 11.11 46.43 
1988 245 27 79.18 20.82 8.98 11.84 48.15 
1989 244 8 85.25 14.75 4.51 10.25 25.00 
1990 249 18 78.31 21.69 8.84 12.85 11.11 
1991 305 54 72.13 27.87 15.41 12.46 18.52 
1992 363 59 74.93 25.07 14.33 10.74 20.34 
1993 428 64 75.70 24.30 12.38 11.92 29.69 
1994 456 37 71.93 28.07 10.09 17.98 13.51 
1995 475 28 73.89 26.11 5.47 20.63 25.00 
1996 518 50 64.09 35.91 9.27 26.64 18.00 
1997 452 52 63.05 36.95 11.28 25.66 19.23 
1998 549 44 55.56 44.44 7.47 36.98 45.45 
1999 613 34 44.37 55.63 8.32 47.31 20.59 
Abs 二 J 二 f 。 v e r -35.51 +35.51 -11.80 +45.65 -29.41 
-44.45% +176.49% -58.65 -58.82 
During 1980-1999，the total number of industrial firms increases from 169 to 613, but dividend 
payer increase from 135 to only 272. It is due to the fact that 1) new listed firms are becoming 
more reluctant to initiate dividend payment; 2) some firms are fading from the dividend payer list. 
Figure 1.2 plots the number of different kinds of firms over our data collection period, which 
constitutes a trend line of dividend-paying practices. We can see that the number of payers 
increased slower than the total number of listed firms during 1980 to 1995，and the number of 
payers even decreases afterwards while the total number of firms still increases, leaving the 
percentage of dividend payer decreases more. The increase in the number of former-payers is 45 
percentage points. Although the increase is partly due to the cumulative effect of non-payers from 
year to year, it is also partly due to the fact that more firms which have once paid out dividends 
ceased to do so and join those non-payers. The sum of the percentage of former-payers and never 
-paid-firms is the percentage of non-payers. This evidence confirms that fewer firms in Hong 
Kong are willing to pay dividends 
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We have also noticed from Figure 1.2 that the percentage of dividend paying firms peaked in year 
1989，and the absolute number of dividend paying firms peaked in as late as year 1992. This 
suggested that the phenomenon of falling percentage of dividend paying firms appears to be a 
recent one. As we have seen, the observations of the U.S. data displayed a rather steady pattern of 
declination in the sample period. The difference, as we will discuss in later parts on dividend 
premium, could be due to the fact that the Hong Kong dividend premium exhibits more 
fluctuations then that of the U.S. It increased, and even reached the positive region in 1992, then 
dropped again into the negative zone. This may help explain why the trend in Hong Kong seems 
to be a recent one. 
We will try in the next session to address the causality of declining dividends in two steps: 1) 
summarize the main characteristics of Hong Kong dividend payers/non-payers; 2) confirm that 
major number of firms is conforming to the characteristics of non-payers. 
Figure 1.2 Proportion of firms according to dividend characteristics 
Counts o f firms in accordance with their dividend feature in each year. Data is obtained from P A C A P Hong Kong 
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1.3 Characteristics of dividend payers 
Following the work of Fama and French, we try to summarize the characteristics of dividend 
payers and non-payers from our previously described data sample by sorting out the major 
differences between them. Evidence of where payers and non-payers differ sheds light on our 
effort to find out effective characteristics. We will mainly focus on three aspects: Firm 
Profitability, Firm Growth Opportunity and Firm Size. 
In this session we would make use of PACAP industrial firms' accounting data such as Net 
Income {E„ INC9) to capture the picture of Profitability and the Total Assets (A,, BAL9) and the 
growth rate of this item to reflect the firm size and the growth opportunity. We will again be 
relying on our previous payers and non-payers category. 
1.3.1 Profitability 
Table 1.3 summarizes the characteristics of firms in various dividend groups. On our PACAP data 
sample from 1980 to 1999, Hong Kong dividend payers have shown higher ability in generating 
earnings compared to non-payers. E, is the aggregate earnings before interest but after taxation 
and E, / A, is the ratio of such an earning to the value of total assets, which eliminates the 
cross-firm size-effect. Our PACAP data shows that Payers outnumbered Non-payers more than 
four times in terms of the average E,/A, during the sample time. The average E,/ At for payers is 
4.52% but only 1.03% for non-payers. In times of recession (1996-1999) when non-payers 
recorded negative earnings, payers have still generated profits on average. However, among the 
group of non-payers, firms that have never paid filed 3.61% in average E,/A„ which is slightly 
less but comparable in amount to that of payers. Former payers recorded loss, their number of 
their average E,/ A, is -0.79% for the years 1980-1999. We can draw our first conclusion about 
firm characteristics, that dividend payers are usually more profitable than non-payers as a whole, 
and much more profitable than firms that once paid, but ceased to pay. Profitability is the first 
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characteristic. 
Table 1.3 Firm Characteristics 
Average ratio o f aggregate earnings to total assets (in percent), yearly change o f total asset (in percent) and firm 
size for various dividend groups. 
E, is earnings before interest but after tax. dA, is A, - A,.,, the ratio shown is the aggregated ratio for year t firms 
according to their dividend group, averaged over the years described by the column head. 
1980-1999 1980-1983 1984-1987 1988-1991 1992-1995 1996-1999 
Et/At (percent) 
All firms 3.61 6.92 5.19 3.54 2.05 0.34 
Payers 4.52 8.16 6.77 3.74 2.29 1.62 
Non-payers 1.03 2.14 0.60 2.33 1.29 -1.23 
Never paid 3.61 4.84 3.61 4.28 3.83 1.50 
Former payers -0.79 -0.92 -0.69 0.52 -0.85 -2.00 
dAt/At(percent) 
All firms 13.67 2.20 19.84 27.94 13.62 4.72 
Payers 40.07 28.33 5735 50.14 34.55 29.95 
Non-payers 15.97 8.18 8 22 42.54 20.27 0.66 
Never paid 24.37 10.60 5.89 30.92 46.46 27.96 
Former payer 9.95 4.05 1 0 . 4 6 34.74 3.64 -3.15 
At (milliott) 
All firms 1.32 0.96 丨.02 1.54 1.56 1.51 
Payers 1.70 1.13 1.28 1.88 1.97 2.24 
Non-payers 0.37 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.56 
Never paid 0.52 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.47 1.13 
Former payers ^ ^ ^ 0.39 
1.3.2 Size 
In terms of asset size, dividend payers are overwhelmingly larger than non-payers. On our PACAP 
industrial firm database from 1980 - 1999，average assets of payers are 1.7 million, almost 6 times 
the number of non-payers' 0.37 {Table 1.3). Among non-payers, never paid firms are of 80% 
larger size than former payers. Never paid firms averaged 0.52 million's total asset versus former 
payers' 0.32 million. The result is a bit different from U.S.'s, where former payers are larger than 
never paid firms (Fama and French, 2001). This difference could partly be due to the signaling 
effect of dividends. In Hong Kong, as we will discuss in the final part of the paper, there seemed 
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that in years of recessions, firms ceased to pay dividends end up decrease more in share price than 
non-payers. This would help explain why former payers are smaller in size, as well as in earnings. 
However, we can still conclude that, the larger the firm is, the more willing it will be to initiate 
dividend payment. 
1.3.3 Growth Opportunity 
Growth opportunity, described by the average yearly change of total assets, d A , lAt,, also differs 
across various dividend groups. We consent to Fama and French (J. Finan. Econ.(2001))’s 
approach to use the change in total asset rather than using capital expenditure in measuring 
investments, which is the index for a firm's growth opportunity. The reason behind that is simple: 
short term assets are actually investments. Firm invests in items like cash, accounts receivable and 
inventories to facilitate business expenditure. 
On our PACAP Hong Kong data set we found that, like the situation in firm profitability, payers 
outperform non-payers in growth rate also. The average number of dA,IA, over 1980 - 1999 for 
payers are 40.07%, almost three folded compared to 15.97% of that of non-payers. Among 
non-payers, dA,IAt averaged at 24.37% for firms that have never paid, again, almost three folded 
former payers' 9.95%. {Table 1.3) The result, however, is slightly different from Fama and French 
(J. Finan. Econ.(2001))'s finding on U.S.'s 1963 - 1998 data, that firms who have never paid 
dividends have the best growth rates. What we observe in Hong Kong is that dividend payers 
actually have comparable amount of investments to that of those who never pay any dividends. 
Current dividend payers are even investing more than firms that have never paid, but the degree of 
difference is not that wide as we observe when comparing profitability and firm size. It suggested 
that whether or not having investments might not be a factor to be considered by firms in Hong 
Kong when making dividend payout decisions. We could only differentiate payers and non-payers 
by comparing their asset growth scale. 
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We could now recap our findings on firm characteristics. Data showed that dividend paying firms 
and non-paying firms differ in two main aspects - firm profitability which is measured by earnings 
divided by total assets and firm size which is measured simply by total assets. Dividend payers 
tend to be large in size and be more profitable than non-payers. Among non-payers, firms that 
have never paid are larger and more profitable than former payers. We did our research on firm 
investments but we did not observe the result that firms with more investments pay less, which 
was proposed in Easterbrook (1984)'s work and confirmed by Fama and French (J. Finan. 
Econ.(2001)) using U.S. data. In Hong Kong, the PACAP data suggest that dividend payers tend 
to be larger and more profitable but firm with more investments will not pay fewer dividends. We 
will try to test this result in late chapters. 
1.4 Changing firm characteristics and declining propensity to pay 
We now try to elaborate why dividends are disappearing in Hong Kong based on the firm 
characteristics we examined in the previous section. The actual percentage of dividend payers 
drops from 79.88% in 1980 to 44.37% in 1999 {Table 1.1.2). We will try to show from Table 1.4 
that the significant drop is partially contributed to the gross changing in firm characteristics 
toward non-paying firms; and partially due to the general decline in the propensity to pay 
dividends, given certain firm characteristic. 
Table 1.4 Changing characteristics and declining propensity to pay 
Data is extracted from PACAP Hong Kong industrial firms database during 1980 - 1999 
The number o f large firm in each year is obtained by counting the number o f firms whose assets exceed year 
average assets. The number o f positive earning firms is obtained by counting the number o f firms that generates 
positive earning to asset ratio in that year. 
Year 1980-83 1984-87 1988-91 1992-95 1996-99 
/I, 
Number o f all firms 194 229.5 290.5 470.75 568.5 
Number o f large firms 37 40.5 53.5 80 92.25 
Number o f large firm that pay 32.25 34.25 51 71 71.5 
Percentage o f large firms 19.2 17.6 18.5 16.9 16.3 
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Percentage o f large firm that pay 86.9 84.1 95.3 88.7 77.9 
E/A, 
Number o f all firms 194 229.5 290.5 470.75 568.5 
Number o f positive earning firms 160.25 187.25 263.75 408.25 397.25 
Number o f positive earning firm that pay 127.75 136.25 195.25 294.5 262.5 
Percentage o f positive earning firms 83.0 81.1 90.7 87.0 70.1 
Percentage o f positive earning firms that pay 80.0 72.7 75.4 72.0 66.5 
As the total number of firms expands, the number of large firms, defined by whose total assets is 
greater than year average, increases. But the proportion of such large firm to the total number of 
firms is declining. In the first 4 year period, the percentage of large firms is 19.2% and the number 
decreased to only 16.3% in the last 4 year period {Table 1.4). In the same token, the percentage of 
firms that have generated positive earnings is also decreasing from 83.0% in the first 4 year period 
to 70% in the last 4 year period. The decline in the proportion of large firms and profitable firms 
gave rise to the inclination of firms towards the characteristic that would be less likely to initiate 
dividend payments. 
On the other hand, given the characteristics that would previously pay dividends, firms are 
becoming more and more hesitating in continuing to pay. The proportion of large firms that paid 
dividends averaged 86.9% in 1980-1983 {Table L4\ reaching its peak in 1988-1991 (95.3%), it 
declined to the average of 77.9% in 1996-1999. The average proportion of profitable firms that 
paid dividends also drops straightly from 1980-1983’s 80.0% to 1996-1999's 66.5%. We see that 
although large and profitable firms are more willing to pay dividends compared to non-payers, 
they are becoming less willing to do so. The combination of the two effects of changing firm 
characteristics and the declining propensity to pay helped explain why the proportion of dividend 
payers in Hong Kong are instantly dropping during our sample period. 
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1.5 Catering Incentives 
In chapter 1.3 and 1.4，we have suggested that larger firms with higher profitability are more 
likely to pay dividends, based on the comparisons of the average total assets and average earnings 
of dividend payers and non-payers. However, in Table 1.4, we see that the proportion of dividend 
payers from the group of large firms also decreases. Our next question is: why? 
Changing firm characteristics provided answers to the decline in Hong Kong dividend payers 
from the supply side. Baker and Wurgler (2004), when studying the U.S. sample, suggested a new 
approach to explain the decline by looking from the demand side, which could help answer the 
question why larger firms with higher profitability are also less willing to pay dividends. In this 
case, investor's demand matters. Empirically, if the dividend premium, a measure to capture the 
preference of investors to dividend payers, is positive, then the proportion of dividend payers will 
increase, and vice versa. 
Following Baker, we calculate the market to book ratio (M/B) for Hong Kong industrial firms. 
The log difference between such ratio for payers and non-payers (payers minus non-payers) 
measures the dividend premium that investors paid on dividend payers. We summarize the result 
for payers and non-payers in each year in Table 1.5. 
Table 1.5 Dividend Premiums 
First we calculate the M/B (market to book ratio) by div id ing total assets minus book equity plus market equity 
with total assets. Book equity is stockholders' equity and the market equity is the fiscal year ending price 
mul t ip l ied by the number o f outstanding common shares. So M/B = (A, - E, + P, xS^ / A,^ and the yearly asset 
weighted average is calculated separately for payers and non-payers. 
The d iv idend premium is the log difference between the weighted average M / B o f payers and non-payers, i.e. 
Dividend Prem. = Ln (M/BlpayersJ) - Ln (M/B[non-payers]) 
Div idend Premiums 
M/B (Total Asset Weighted) 
Payer Non-payer Premiums 
1980 0.520647 0.349462 0.398678 
1981 0.473336 0.317759 0.398512 
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1982 0 .479305 0 .566606 -0.16733 
1983 0 .503985 0 .616890 -0.20214 
1984 0 .526138 0 .659829 -0.22642 
1985 0 .507298 0 .624870 -0.20845 
1986 0 .550534 0 .631334 -0.13695 
1987 0 .453240 0.666972 -0.38633 
1988 0 .416236 0.609901 -0.38204 
1989 0.439791 0 .527164 -0.18121 
1990 0 .433542 0 .497917 -0.13844 
1991 0 .437936 0 .621396 -0.34990 
1992 0 .442694 0 .459067 -0.03632 
1993 0 .429884 0 .413602 0.038611 
1994 0 .416566 0 .472487 -0.12597 
1995 0 .449873 0 .478496 -0.06168 
1996 0 .432876 0 .454297 -0.04830 
1997 0 .446487 0 .474324 -0.06048 
1998 0 .439520 0 .548148 -0.22086 
1999 0.407961 0.539871 -0.28016 
As we see from Table 1.5, the dividend premium was positive in 1980 and 1981，leading firms to 
pay dividends in exchange for gains on such premium. But it changed sign and dropped to the 
negative zone after 1982, indicating that the investors in the market place put no more benefits to 
dividend payers, reason of which the payers start to fade away. Figure 1.5 plots the trend of the 
premium over year. 
Figure 1.5 showed that except 1993，the dividend premium of Hong Kong industrial firms stayed 
in the negative zone, and after 1993，it is dropping. As long as such premium remains negative, if 
not keep dropping, the number of payers will intuitively not increase. The demand side approach 
help explain the decline in dividend payers. 
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Figure 1.5 Dividend Premiums 
We plot Table 1.4 in this chart to show how the dividend premium declined to negative zone. The Dividend 
Premium is calculated by taking the log difference between the M / B o f payers and non-payers, which is weight 
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2. Aggregate dividends 
Although we have found in previous parts that over the past two decades the number of dividend 
paying companies in Hong Kong are decreasing proportionately, it does not necessarily mean that 
the actual dividend is decreasing over time. On the contrary，the aggregate dividends paid are 
actually increasing both in nominal and real terms. 
Table 2.1 Aggregate dividends 
Aggregated Nomina l /Rea l Dividends: The real dividends are calculated using 1980 money. The Consumer Price 
Index is used as the denominator. 
C P l data is from the fo l lowing website: http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/cpi/cpi_std_index.html and 
also from the Census and Statistics Department, H K S A R 
Year Aggregate nomina l dividends Aggregate real dividends CPI 
1980 5599247 5599247 1 
16 
1981 8859884 7773834 1.139706 
1982 7601905 6028333 1.261029 
1983 5563211 4013776 1.386029 
1984 8958162 5986781 1.496324 
1985 12032669 7792586 1.544118 
1986 11301335 7115655 1.588235 
1987 36595848 21829102 1.676471 
1988 25924875 14390951 1.801471 
1989 40254209 20276194 1.985294 
1990 34492244 15847788 2.176471 
1991 36138929 14871087 2 .430147 
1992 49782511 18728690 2 .658088 
1993 63280740 21954542 2.882353 
1994 65334313 20956289 3 .117647 
1995 71627325 21153781 3 .386029 
1996 70104897 19537430 3.588235 
1997 71881878 18945611 3 .794118 
1998 48094668 12352927 3.893382 
1999 70455016 18696355 3.768382 
+丨丨58% 
Table 2.1 shows that aggregate nominal dividends increased by 1158% for industrial firms in 
Hong Kong, from 5.5 million in 1980 to 70.4 million in 1999, whereas the aggregate real 
dividends increased by 233.91%. The sharp increase in the aggregate real dividend paid could be 
contributed to the economic growth during the last two decades. We will naturally wish to control 
for the growth effect to see if the total amount of dividends really increased or not. 
We use the number of aggregate earnings and the number of aggregate firm total assets (both in 
real terms) to represent the size of the economy as a whole in a specific year. We found that the 
aggregate real dividends basically go hand in hand with the amount of aggregate real earnings. 
Table 2.2 showed that the aggregate earnings for all firms also grew by 1141.14% in nominal and 
229.36% in real. Aggregate total assets for all firms grew 547.05% in nominal and 71.71% in real, 
which is in fact not much related to dividend growth rates. Figure 2.1 visualizes the parallel 
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pattern of the time trend of aggregate real dividends compared with the time trend of aggregate 
real earnings. It showed that when real earnings increase (decrease), real dividends increase 
(decrease) as well. 
Table 2.2 Aggregate Earnings 
Aggregate Nominal/Real Total Earnings o f all firms: The real earnings are calculated using 1980 money. The 
Consumer Price Index is used as the denominator 
Year Aggregate nominal earnings Aggregate real earnings CPI 
1980 10768770 10768770 1 
1981 16737364 14685687 1.139706 
1982 丨丨392326 9034148 丨.261029 
1983 12089874 8722668 1.386029 
1984 1393丨858 9310726 1.496324 
1985 丨6436640 10644681 1.544118 
1986 27713798 17449428 1.588235 
1987 39977653 23846319 1.676471 
1988 53711204 29815199 1.801471 
1989 54537361 2747067丨 1.985294 
1990 55381187 25445410 2.176471 
1991 69748827 28701484 2.430147 
1992 91219205 34317599 2.658088 
1993 110636008 38383921 2.882353 
1994 119755997 38412301 3.117647 
1995 132188138 39039276 3.386029 
1996 丨32827428 37017480 3.588235 
1997 122197327 32207047 3.794118 
1998 84434274 21686612 3.893382 
1999 133655910 35467715 3.768382 
二 lute 1141.140/0 229.36% 
(% ) Change 
Average Nominal/Real Total Assets o f dividend Payers: The real Total Assets are calculated using 1980 money. The 
Consumer Price Index is used as the denominator 
Table 2.2 Continue: 
Year Average nominal total assets Average real total assets CPI 
1980 1047823 1047823 1 
1981 1287581 1129749 1.139706 
1982 1520430 1205706 1.261029 
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1983 1601645 丨155564 1.386029 
1984 1774138 1185664 1.496324 
1985 1598886 1035469 1.544118 
1986 2145576 1350918 丨.588235 
1987 2595933 1548451 1.676471 
1988 3545913 1968343 1.801471 
1989 3644397 1835696 1.985294 
1990 4064647 1867540 2.176471 
1991 4475602 1841700 2.430147 
1992 4642383 1746512 2.658088 
1993 5739479 1991248 2.882353 
1994 6630322 2126707 3.117647 
1995 6873560 2029976 3.386029 
1996 7623615 2124614 3.588235 
1997 8791618 2317171 3.794118 
1998 7720788 1983054 3.893382 
1999 9622489 2553480 3.768382 
818.33% 143.69% 
Figure 2.1 
Aggregate real dividends and earnings (in millions) 
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We then normalize the aggregate real dividends by the size of the economy (the number of 
aggregate real earnings) for each specific year, indexing the real earnings by 1980 aggregate real 
earning. The so-derived aggregate real dividends have shown remarkable stability over the sample 
period. Table 2.J showed that the aggregate real dividends increased by only 1.38% after 
normalized by aggregate real earnings. It has suggested that the amount of real dividend as a 
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portion of aggregate real earnings did not actually reduce despite the fact that the percentage of 
dividend payers decreased drastically by 35%. Firms that quit paying dividends seem to have no 
significant impact on the aggregate earnings as well as on the aggregate dividends paid out. The 
propensity of the whole economy to pay dividends, contrast to the declining one from the 
individual firm side to pay dividends, has not changed, which is an interesting phenomenon in 
Hong Kong. It is like that the earnings and dividends are "concentrated", the situation of which 
we will discuss in the later parts of this paper. 
Table 2.3 Aggregate real normalized dividends 
Aggregate Real Dividends normalized by aggregate real earnings (using Aggregate real earnings index obtained 
by dividend each year's aggregate real earning by 1980 aggregate real earning) 
Aggregate real dividends t 1 • . d 
Year Aggregate real dividends ( n o m ^ j ^ z ^ Y real �� 
1980 5599247 5599247 1 
1981 7773834 5700423 1.363729 
1982 6028333 7185817 0.838921 
1983 4013776 4955299 0.809997 
1984 5986781 6924301 0.864604 
1985 7792586 7883427 0.988477 
1986 7115655 4391367 1.620373 
1987 21829102 9857814 2.214396 
1988 14390951 5197780 2.768673 
1989 20276194 7948465 2.550957 
1990 15847788 6706954 2.362889 
1991 14871087 5579618 2.665252 
1992 18728690 5877012 3.186771 
1993 21954542 6159439 3.564374 
1994 20956289 5875031 3.567009 
1995 21153781 5835154 3.625231 
1996 19537430 5683642 3.437484 
1997 18945611 6334667 2.990782 
1998 12352927 6134007 2.013843 
1999 18696355 5676620 3.293572 
》bsolute 233.910/0 , 游 
Change % 1.38% 
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3. Dividend concentration and Earning concentration 
We find out in the previous sessions that the total number of real dividends paid out did not 
decrease even though the number of payers decreased. As the number of payers gets smaller, the 
total dividends stay at a rather constant level throughout the years, which, as a result, exhibits a 
concentration effect. In Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner's work (Harry 
DeAngelo, 2004), they documented a substantial increase in large payers' dividend share in the 
total amount paid. Follow their footstep, we use the cash dividends ( D t , MKTl) data and the data 
on firms' net income in the following to analyze this concentration effect in Hong Kong industrial 
firms. Table 3.1 ranks dividend payers in Hong Kong industrial firms by the amount of dividend 
they paid in 1980，1990 and 1999. Since the number of payers differs from year to year, we use 
10% percentile in grouping. 
Table 3.1 D iv i dend Concentrations for Hong Kong industrial firms from 1980，1990 to 1999 
Firms are sorted by the total cash dividends paid in each year. The cash dividend amount is obtained from PACAP 
database. Compared to DeAnge lo (2004) method to use the fixed number as interval, we use more flexible method 
o f us ing percentiles, since one year's absolute number o f observations is different from the other. We actually had 
done both methods, but after compar ing the statistics outcomes the percentile method is more satisfactory. Top 
10% firms includes top 13 firms in 1980 or top 19 firms in 1990 or top 27 firms in 1999. See Appendix 1 for the 
full table 
Dividend Percent of total Dividend Real Dividends 
Ranking 
1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
Top 10% 63 .10% 64 .86% 77 .59% 3,532,865 10，278’237 14,505,759 
10。/o-20% 16 .47% 16.30% 10.14% 922,373.7 2,583,647 1,896,421 
20%-30% 8 .44% 6 .84% 4 .52% 472,775 1,084,168 845,647.9 
30%-40% 4 . 58% 3 .96% 2 .85% 256,703.9 627,326.4 533,506.5 
4 0 % - 5 0 % 2 . 97% 2 .77% 1.82% 166,497.5 438,801.2 340,792.7 
50%-60% 1.83% 2 .01% 1.16% 102,204 319,166.7 217,174.1 
60%-70% 1.24% 1.37% 0.79% 69,421.62 216,532.6 丨 47,309 
70%-80% 0 . 69% 0 .95% 0 .56% 38,596.42 150,084.2 104,090.5 
80%-90% 0 . 41% 0 .58% 0 .37% 22,911 91,825.84 69,570.56 
90%-100% 0 . 27% 0 .37% 0 .19% 14,898.9 57,998.07 36,083.6 
Total for all 丨00 .0% 100.0% lOO.Oo/o 5,599,247 15，847，788 18,696,355 
finns 
N u m b e r o f , 33 ,95 272 135 195 272 
Firms 
21 
The first three columns represent percent of total dividend paid in 1980，1990 and 1999 and the 
last three columns reports the total dividend amount as denominated by 1980 dollar. The table 
shows that 10% of the dividend payers in 1999 contribute to nearly 80% of the total dividend 
amount. It also illustrates the trend that top payers are taking up more overwhelming impact on 
total real dividend. In 1999，the top 10% payers paid nearly 4 times more than the amount they 
paid in 1980 in real term, whereas the bottom 10% payers paid nearly half of the amount in 1990. 
Figures also show that although the number of small payers decreases largely, the number of 
heavy payers has increased. This helped explain the contrast of increasing dividend versus 
decreasing dividend payer. 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates a steady trend of increase of dividend share of top 10% payers over 
1980-1999. As a result, the top category of dividend payers now pay more dividends while the 
bottom category of payers pay less dividends, the aggregate effect of which is an increase in total 
dividend paid in the face of the decreasing of number of payers. As Black and Scholes (1974) and 
Miller (1977) argued, the decrease in the number of payers is not caused by a reduction in 
aggregate demand, but reflects a change in firms' dividend policies. 
A firm's dividend policy is largely depended on its earnings, which suggests that the increasing 
dividend concentration we observe from Hong Kong industrial firms may due to the result of 
increasing earnings concentration. Table 3.2 ranks dividend payers in Hong Kong industrial firms 
in a similar way like Table 3.1，yet by their earnings in 1980，1990 and 1999. Earnings are also 
concentrated from 1980 to 1999 and exhibit an increasing trend. 
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Figure 3.1 Dividend Ranking 
The proportion o f the d iv idend paid by top 10% dividend payer 
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Table 3.2 Earn ing Concentrations for Hong Kong industrial firms from 1980, 1990 to 1999 
Earn ing Data is obtained from P A C A P database and is denominated to 1980 dollar. As mentioned in the notes o f 
Table 3.1，we actually tested both methods o f using fixed number interval versus using percentile as interval, in 
total d iv idend case the result is more satisfactory under percentile method, but in earnings case using fixed interval 
provides better outcomes. See Append ix 2 for the full table. 
Ranking Real Earnings Percentage Earnings 
1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
Top 25 2,291,973 10’523，274 16，657，528 21 .28% 41 .36% 46.97% 
26-50 5,057,350 6,168,65 丨 5，429，482 46.96% 24.24% 15.31% 
51-75 2,368,257 4,23,9757 3,290,392 21.99% 16.66% 9.28% 
76-100 814,865 1,711,619 2,359,345 7.57% 6.73% 6.65% 
101-125 186,282 723,101.9 1,117,475 1.73% 2 .84% 3 .15% 
126-150 50,043 719,359.6 2,032,752 0 . 46% 2 .83% 5 .73% 
151-175 0 110,9854 996,879.7 4 .36% 2 .81% 
176-200 0 249,793.4 1,176,363 0.98% 3.32% 
201-225 0 0 1,113,574 3 .14% 
226-250 0 0 613,127.8 1.73% 
251-275 0 0 680,796.6 1.92% 
276-300 0 0 0 0.00% 
301-325 0 0 0 0 .00% 
326-350 0 0 0 0 .00% 
2 3 
351-375 0 0 0 0.00% 
Total for all 丨0，768，770 25,445,410 35,467,715 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
firms 
Number o f ,35 195 272 135 195 272 
Firms 
Our findings in this section revealed the fact that the earnings of a small number of top earners are 
earning more than they used to be. Top earners thus generate majority of dividends. While 
increasing number of firms quit paying dividends, they exert a collectively minus impact on the 
aggregated dividend paid, which may help explain the dual effect of declining dividend payers 
versus steady aggregated dividend paid. 
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Chapter II Cross Country Comparisons 
The dividend facts we found in Chapter I for Hong Kong industrial firms mainly agree with the 
findings of Fama and DeAngelo from the U.S. industrial firms' database. We want to see whether 
the results apply to other economies with perhaps different tax systems or leverage regulations. 
Being focused on the PACAP database, we extend our research to some other East Asian 
economies. We will also select firms that are non-financial and non-utility and label them 
industrial firms, and collect the accounting data like Total Assets (A,, BAL9), Long Term Loans 
(BALM), Net Income (E,，INC9), Cash Dividends (D„ MKTl), Ending Price-Common Stock (P„ 
MKT3) and Number of shares outstanding (MKTS) from the database. We inherit the definition of 
payers and non-payers in this Chapter. 
I. Proportion to pay dividends (Facts in other East Asian economies) 
Table 4.1 summarizes the counts of firms in sample, firms that pay dividends, firms that do not 
and firms never do. 
Table 4.1 Dividend Payers' proportion 
N u m b e r o f P A C A P Japan industrial firms over 1980-1999: Div idend payers versus non-payers 
In each year we calculate the number o f d iv idend payers and divide it by total number o f firms to obtain the payer's 
percentage. 
Japan 
PACAP n. .J ^ 
” . , Dividend . , _ 
Year Industrial Pa ' e r ( % ) P^V^"" nonpayer never paid Former payer 
firms . o 
1980 1259 85.86 1081 178 178 0 
1981 1274 84.22 1073 201 160 41 
1982 1291 81.80 1056 235 147 88 
1983 1307 81.48 1065 242 134 108 
1984 1327 82.29 1092 235 127 108 
1985 1338 82.96 1110 228 112 116 
1986 1334 82.76 1104 230 95 135 
1987 1394 84.72 1181 213 80 133 
1988 1442 89.32 1288 154 58 96 
1989 1466 91.61 1343 123 46 77 
1990 1480 92.64 1371 109 33 76 
25 
1991 1496 91.51 1369 127 30 97 
1992 1513 87.05 1317 196 28 168 
1993 1529 81.95 1253 276 26 250 
1994 1553 80.30 1247 306 23 283 
1995 1582 82.43 1304 278 22 256 
1996 1629 84.65 1379 250 19 231 
1997 1655 80.00 1324 331 21 310 
1998 1698 77.15 1310 388 18 370 
1999 1606 77.96 1252 354 15 339 
Absolute Change over „ 
1980-1999 
Table 4.1 continue 
Numbe r o f P A C A P Korean industrial firms over 1980-1999: Div idend payers versus non-payers 
In each year we calculate the number o f d iv idend payers and divide it by total number o f firms to obtain the payer's 
percentage. 
Korea 
l)ACAI) D i v i d end 
Year Industrial „ . payer nonpayer never paid former payer 
firms /•>) 
1980 10 20.00 2 8 8 0 
1981 245 62.86 154 91 91 0 
1982 243 61.73 150 93 68 25 
1983 248 68.95 171 77 49 28 
1984 255 72.16 184 71 43 28 
1985 266 74.06 197 69 35 34 
1986 271 76.75 208 63 31 32 
1987 296 74.32 220 76 38 38 
1988 375 66.13 248 127 84 43 
1989 474 66.67 316 158 102 56 
1990 527 74.38 392 135 55 80 
1991 535 72.90 390 145 46 99 
1992 539 65.12 351 188 39 149 
1993 544 56.80 309 235 42 193 
1994 564 61.52 347 217 44 173 
1995 601 63.23 380 221 49 172 
1996 634 67.82 430 204 53 151 
1997 612 6.86 42 570 73 497 
1998 585 48.55 284 301 23 278 
1999 617 43.60 269 348 24 324 
Abso lu te Change over , „ 
1981-1999 
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Table 4.1 continue 
Number o f P A C A P Taiwan industrial firms over 1980-1999: Div idend payers versus non-payers 
In each year we calculate the number o f d iv idend payers and divide it by total number o f firms to obtain the payer's 
percentage. 
Taiwan 
l)ACAI) D i v i d end 
Year Industrial 口 、 payer nonpayer never paid former payer 
firms t^ayer(/o) 
1980 84 70.24 59 25 25 0 
1981 91 74.73 68 23 19 4 
1982 94 59.57 56 38 21 17 
1983 98 47.96 47 51 18 33 
1984 95 56.84 54 41 18 23 
1985 93 47.31 44 49 19 30 
1986 101 34.65 35 66 16 50 
1987 114 40.35 46 68 24 44 
1988 133 39.10 52 81 40 41 
1989 147 36.73 54 93 42 51 
1990 166 27.11 45 121 56 65 
1991 185 27.03 50 135 62 73 
1992 217 28.11 61 156 80 76 
1993 251 26.69 67 184 90 94 
1994 273 24.54 67 206 108 98 
1995 301 24.92 75 226 127 99 
1996 331 27.79 92 239 129 110 
1997 277 20.94 58 219 131 88 
1998 313 15.97 50 263 127 136 
1999 247 28.74 71 176 80 96 
Abso lu te Change over ^ 
1980-1999 
Table 4.1 listed the proportion of dividend payers of three East Asian economies in each year 
from 1980 to 1999. Regardless of how much aggregated dividend was paid over time, the number 
of payers as a proportion of total number of industrial firms displays a diminishing trend, as is 
shown in Figure 4. However, the pattern of such trend differs. When compared with Hong Kong 
and other economies, Japan is an exception that the proportion of its payers stayed almost steady 
at high level over 20 years. Korean data has some outliers in the first year of observation and in 
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the year of 1997 when the financial crisis broke out in the region. We put aside its 1980 data and 
starts from 1981 directly. Taiwan matches Hong Kong the most in the diminishing trends. The 
proportion of its payers drops drastically from 70.24% to 28.74%. Why there is such discrepancy 
in the diminishing pattern? We learned that the economies differ in leverage regulations. We try 
to use the firms' leverage level to obtain an possible explanation in the next session. 
Figure 4 Proportion to pay 
W e plot the data series o f d iv idend payers from Table 4.1, plus the relevant data for Hong Kong in the figure. The 
top line is that o f Japan which shows little decrease, others are similar pattern while Korean data contains 
fluctuations dur ing 1997 As ian financial crisis. 
Cross Country Comparison - Proportion to Pay 
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2. Long-term loan 
We obtain the long-term loan data from the PACAP database (BALM). The item itself could be 
biased if not controlled for the firm size effect. We normalize the long-term loan by the total asset 
to obtain the loan-to-asset ratio. Figure 5 plots the trend of such ratio for the three East Asian 
economies plus Hong Kong 
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Figure 5 Loan to Asset ratios 
The ratio is obtained by taking the average o f long-term-loan to total asset ratio o f a year. Japan stayed at a 
relatively l ow end, compared with its high position in dividend payer proportion. 
Cross Country Compar ison - Loam to Assets 
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When comparing Figure 4 <6 5，we can see that Japanese firms are most willing to pay dividends 
while borrowing the least. In the contrast, Taiwan has relatively high loan to asset ratio but is least 
likely to pay dividend. Based on such findings, we conjecture that long-term debt can be a key 
factor to affect firms' dividend policy. Although it seems that a firm with more debt requires less 
equity for operation, and thus the dividend divided by total equity could be less dependent on the 
leverage level a firm has, it would be dependent if we consider the ratio of dividend payout to 
total assets. I f this is the case in East Asia, the idea may help explain the dividend payout 
discrepancy between U.S. and Hong Kong as is mentioned in Chapter 1.1. The conjecture will be 
tested in next section. 
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3. Regressions 
As shown in last paragraphs, firm's long term debt is expected to have negative effect on firms' 
dividend payout. Our hypothesis is: 
Firms that owe fewer debts will pay more dividends. 
The following OLS regression is to estimate, each year, the regression of dividends (scaled by 
assets) on firm's leverage level, controlling firm characteristics (including firm size, profitability, 
investment opportunity) and interest rate. 
= a+/J,Ln(AJ +P2E/A, +P3dA/A, +P4L/A, +fisint + e (3.1) 
The regressions are run for the period of 1980 - 1999. The table shows the coefficient, and 
t-statistics. The dependent variable is D,+i/A,+i, target dividends payout over assets in year t+1. 
The independent variables are: firm size Ln(At), profitability E/At (scaled by assets), investment 
opportunity dAt/A,, Long - term loan L,/At(scaled by assets), and interest rate in year t. 
Table 5 Summary regression 
A Ln(A,) E,/A, dA,/A, L,/A, Int No. ofObs. 
0.0179911 0.0020724 0.0000642-0.0000533~-0.1075087 0.0006744 
H. K. 5094 
(0.48) (0.98) (0.26) (-0.16) (-3.03) (0.42) 
-.0100853 0.0008671 0.0789284 -0.0002211 -0.0008162 0.000817 
Taiwan 3059 
(-1.42) (2.02) (17.64) (-0.41) (-0.39) (2.74) 
7.101117 -0.0315388 37.42289 -0.0671257 -14.53268 0.1566342 
Japan 26107 
(30.67) (-1.58) (55.05) (-0.5) (-49.57) (10.7) 
0.033694 丨 -0.0009582 0.0078277 0.0000978 -0.0008414 -0.0008802 
Korea 7791 
(32.82) (-17.51) (11.57) (0.57) (-1.54) (-21.58) 
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Consistent with our conjecture, long term debt is negative correlated with dividend payout in all 
four economies. The /-statistics are significant in Hong Kong and Japan, but not in Taiwan and 
South Korea. 
We know that a type of agency problem associated with dividend policy pertains to the conflict 
between debt-holders and shareholders; dividend payments can potentially transfer wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders by reducing the expected value of the firm at the maturity of the bond 
and increasing the risk of default. 
Thus the possible reasons for the dividend payout discrepancy between U.S. and Hong Kong, 
from the long term debt point of view, are: 1) U.S. firms generally issue more debts than HK. 
Evidence can be found in a paper “why doesn't Asia have bigger bond market?" (Barry 
Eithengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai) It is reported that in percentages of GDP, in sector of 
corporate issuers, U.S. issued 23.90 in contrast to 3.07 of Hong Kong. 2) U.S. requires more 
covenants on bonds to restrict dividend payments, which can protect the interest of debt-holders 
by reducing the scope for potential wealth transfers. U.S. has much higher corporate bond default 
rate than HK. Specifically, ninety-nine defaulters were U.S. - domiciled and four were domiciled 
in Hong Kong in 1999 (Moody's Investors service, 2000). To reduce the high risk of bondholders 
in U.S., we would expect that such restrictive covenants are more common in developed countries 
because of lower transaction costs of enforcing such provisions. 
Another idea, which is also popular, is that firms can signal future profitability by paying 
dividends (Bhattacharya 1979). The dividend announcement provides shareholders and the 
marketplace the missing piece of information about current earnings upon which their estimation 
of the firm's future (expected) earnings is based. The latter, of course, determines the current 
market value of the firm. Empirically in Hong Kong, we found in Table 6 that given share price 
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increase, the price of a firm that newly announced dividend payment increased more than usual, 
while as when given share price decrease, the price of a firm that newly cutoff dividend payment 
decreased more. This might suggest that there is signaling effect of dividend in Hong Kong. 
Combined with the debt effect, it could help explain why Hong Kong firms pay more dividends 
than U.S. despite the decreasing trend of paying. 
Table 6 Signaling Effectiveness 
The data is obtained from PACAP database from 1980-1999. We put together all the firms in all 
years that meet with the "new payer, increasing share price" or "new non-payer, decreasing share 
price" criteria, and delete outliers 
All firms all years given share price increases Average Percentage increase in share ending price 
Firms that are new dividend payers 80.52o/o 
Firms that are not new payers, nor new non-payers 75.92% 
All firms all years given share price decreases Average Percentage decrease in share ending price 
Firms that are new non-payers -43.58% 
Firms that are not new non-payer, nor new payer -33.86% 
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Chapter III Conclusion 
This paper investigates the issue of disappearing dividends in Hong Kong and other East Asia 
countries: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. We find that the number of dividend paying firms in 
Hong Kong declines 35% during the period from 1980 to 1999. In contrast, the aggregated 
dividend payout amount increases dramatically, 233.91% in real term during the same time frame. 
We argue that the reasons behind are dividend concentration and earning concentration, i.e., the 
small amount of high profitability firms provide a huge supply of dividend. We also confirm that 
firms that are more likely to pay dividends tend to be larger and more profitable, but firms with 
fewer investments are not necessarily less likely to pay dividend. Moreover, the combination of the 
effects of changing firm characteristics and the declining propensity to pay, plus the negative 
dividend premium which signals no incentive to pay help explain why the proportion of dividend 
payers in Hong Kong are continuously dropping during our sample period. 
Despite the similar dividend-paying trend in U.S. and Hong Kong, the level of proportion to pay 
differs significantly in two economies. Our regression results confirm that firms owing more debt 
are less likely to pay dividend. Therefore, the reasons for the discrepancy in proportion to pay in 
U.S. and Hong Kong are 1) U.S. firms issue more debts than Hong Kong firms do; 2) U.S. firms 
have more restrictive covenants on bonds to prevent the higher default rates. 
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3. Test-Statistics of OLS regressions 
The regression output from the OLS test of the leverage effect on the dividend payout decision 
discussed in Chapter II session 3 
1) Hong Kong 
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 5094 
F( 5， 5088) = 1.88 
Model I . 685852697 5 .137170539 Prob〉F = 0.0939 
Residual | 370.691554 5088 .072856044 R-squared = 0.0018 
Adj R-squared = 0. 0009 
Total I 371.377407 5093 .072919184 Root MSE 二 .26992 
dtlatl I Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Inat I . 0020724 .002325 0.89 0.373 -. 0024857 .0066304 
etat I . 0000642 .0002513 0.26 0.798 0004285 .0005569 
datat I -.0000533 .0003423 -0.16 0.876 -. 0007244 .0006178 
Itloanat | -. 1075087 .0354686 -3.03 0.002 1770425 -. 0379749 
interest | . 0006744 .0015965 0.42 0.673 0024554 .0038042 
_cons I . 0179911 .0374032 0.48 0.631 -. 0553353 .0913175 
2) South Korea 
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 7791 
F( 5, 7785) = 261.60 
Model I . 055409383 5 .011081877 Prob > F 二 0.0000 
Residual | . 329784912 7785 .000042362 R-squared = 0.1438 
Adj R-squared = 0. 1433 
Total I . 385194296 7790 .000049447 Root MSE = . 00651 
dtlatl I Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Inat I - 0009582 .0000547 -17.51 0.000 -. 0010655 000851 
etat I .0078277 .0006766 11.57 0.000 .0065013 .0091541 
datat I . 0000978 .0001711 0.57 0.567 0002375 .0004332 
Itloanat | -. 0008414 .0005461 -1.54 0.123 - 0019119 .0002292 
interestrate | - 0008802 .0000408 -21.58 0.000 0009602 0008003 
-Cons I . 0336941 .0010266 32.82 0.000 .0316817 .0357066 
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3) Taiwan 
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 3059 
F( 5， 3053) = 69.51 
Model I . 225412627 5 .045082525 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual | 1.98001508 3053 .000648547 R-squared = 0.1022 
Adj R-squared = 0. 1007 
Total I 2.2054277 3058 .000721199 Root MSE = .02547 
dtlatl I Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Inat I .0008671 .0004296 2.02 0.044 .0000247 .0017095 
etat I . 0789284 .0044737 17.64 0.000 .0701567 .0877001 
datat i - 0002211 .0005438 -0.41 0.684 -.0012873 .0008452 
Itloanat | - 0008162 .0021057 -0.39 0.698 004945 .0033125 
interest | .000817 .000298 2.74 0.006 .0002328 .0014012 
_cons I - 0100853 .0071237 -1.42 0.157 -.0240531 .0038825 
4)Japan 
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 26107 
F( 5, 26101) = 1481.05 
Model I 151399.361 5 30279.8722 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual | 533629.867 26101 20.4448054 R-squared = 0.2210 
+ Adj R-squared = 0.2209 
Total I 685029.228 26106 26.2402983 Root MSE = 4.5216 
dtlatl I Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
+ 
Inat I - 0315388 .0199207 -1.58 0.113 0705844 .0075068 
etat 1 37.42289 .6797838 55.05 0.000 36.09048 38.75531 
datat I -.0671257 . 1334726 -0.50 0.615 - 3287392 .1944879 
Itloanat | -14.53268 .2931775 -49.57 0.000 -15. 10733 -13.95804 
interest | . 1566342 .0146393 10.70 0.000 .1279405 .185328 
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